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I. INTRODUCTION 
On a winter morning in 2009, Ronald Fleck, who was 
indisputably intoxicated at the time, stabbed his romantic partner 
once in the shoulder with a kitchen knife.1  Fleck was prosecuted 
for second-degree assault in Minnesota state court.2  At trial, he 
attempted to invoke the statutory defense of voluntary 
intoxication.3  Because voluntary intoxication can mitigate the 
element of specific intent, Fleck’s case turned on whether the State 
was required to prove that Fleck had the specific intent to injure 
the victim.  Going against precedent, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court concluded that assault that results in bodily harm requires 
only a general intent to act and not the specific intent to inflict 
harm.4 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Fleck 
underscores several vexing problems with the legislature’s 
definition of assault and, more broadly, with the statutory 
definitions of culpable mental states used throughout Minnesota’s 
Criminal Code.  This article argues that classifying an assault that 
results in bodily harm as a general-intent offense essentially 
imposes strict liability for any volitional physical act that produces 
bodily harm.  This notion is at odds with firmly embedded 
 
 1.  State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 305–06 (Minn. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 305. 
 3.  Id. at 306. 
 4.  See id. at 308–12.  The case also drew the attention of battered-women 
advocates.  Several such organizations submitted a joint amicus brief to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.  See Brief for Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women 
et al. as Amici Curiae, Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 (No. A10-0681), 2011 WL 7561619. 
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principles of criminal jurisprudence and may have additional 
consequences in the areas of criminal, civil, and administrative law.  
The article sets forth several proposals for modifying Minnesota’s 
criminal statutes to bring them in line with fundamental criminal 
law principles and eliminate the collateral damage that results from 
the supreme court’s continued reliance on the common law 
general/specific intent dichotomy in interpreting criminal statutes. 
II. MINNESOTA’S ASSAULT STATUTE 
A. Assault Defined 
The criminal offense of assault is defined in the “Definitions” 
section of Minnesota’s Criminal Code, Minnesota Statutes section 
609.02.5  Subdivision 10 of that sect\ion provides: “‘Assault’ is: (1) 
an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate 
bodily harm or death; or (2) the intentional infliction of or attempt 
to inflict bodily harm upon another.”6 
B. Intent Defined 
Section 609.02 also defines the terms “with intent to” and 
“intentionally” in a separate subdivision.  The relevant portions7 of 
section 609.02, subdivision 9, provide: 
Mental state.8  (1) When criminal intent is an element of a 
 
 5.  Minnesota’s Criminal Code provides a single, general definition of 
assault, which is incorporated into multiple specific assault offenses.  First-degree 
assault, for example, is an assault that results in “great bodily harm” or an assault 
of “a peace officer or correctional employee by using or attempting to use deadly 
force.”  MINN. STAT. § 609.221, subdiv. 1, 2 (2012).  See also id. §§ 609.222 (second-
degree assault), .223 (third-degree assault), .2231 (fourth-degree assault), .224 
(fifth-degree assault).  The criminal code contains separate provisions for the 
offense of domestic assault.  See id. §§ 609.2242, .2247.  Section 609.2242, entitled 
“Domestic Assault,” restates the general definition of assault provided by section 
609.02.  Id. § 609.2242, subdiv. 1. 
 6.  § 609.02, subdiv. 10. 
 7.  Section 609.02, subdivision 9, contains two additional provisions 
regarding mental state, which are not relevant to the discussion here. 
 8.  In drafting Minnesota’s criminal code in 1963, the legislature “borrowed” 
from the Model Penal Code’s approach for identifying the mens rea required for 
particular offenses.  See State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72–73 (Minn. 1996), 
superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of May 6, 1997, ch. 96, § 7, 1997 Minn. 
Laws 694, 700, as recognized in King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 159 (Minn. 2002).  
Rather than using the general/specific intent dichotomy, which is susceptible to 
confusion, the Model Penal Code divided mens rea into four categories: purpose, 
knowledge, negligence, and recklessness.  Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 
3
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crime in this chapter, such intent is indicated by the term 
“intentionally,” the phrase “with intent to,” the phrase 
“with intent that,” or some form of the verbs “know” or 
“believe.” 
(2) “Know” requires only that the actor believes that the 
specified fact exists. 
(3) “Intentionally” means that the actor either has a 
purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or 
believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful, 
will cause that result.  In addition, . . . the actor must have 
knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make the 
actor’s conduct criminal and which are set forth after the 
word “intentionally.” 
(4) “With intent to” or “with intent that” means that the 
actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the 
result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will 
cause that result.9 
III. STATE V. FLECK 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
1. Facts 
Ronald Fleck and K.W. lived together in Alexandria, 
Minnesota.10  The morning of January 23, 2009, K.W. arrived home 
to find an already-inebriated Fleck drinking in the kitchen.11  Fleck 
called K.W.’s name, and, as she turned towards him, Fleck stabbed 
K.W. near her shoulder with a large butcher knife and then walked 
away.12 
When law enforcement officers arrived on the scene, they 
found K.W. in a bathroom with a small puncture wound to her 
chest near her shoulder.13  Fleck was sitting in a chair and, before 
becoming unresponsive, told the officers that he had taken forty 
sleeping pills.14  Both Fleck and K.W. were taken to the hospital.15  
 
(1962)). 
 9.  § 609.02, subdiv. 9. 
 10.  State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Minn. 2012). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 305–06. 
 13.  State v. Fleck, 797 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).  The wound 
was minor enough that it did not require stitches.  Transcript of Trial at 289–90, 
State v. Fleck, No. 21-CR-09-239 (Douglas Cnty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 3–4, 2009). 
 14.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306; Fleck, 797 N.W.2d at 735. 
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Tests revealed that Fleck had a blood alcohol level of 0.315 
g/dL16—almost four times the legal limit for operating a motor 
vehicle.17 
2. Procedural History 
Fleck was charged with a single count of second-degree assault 
with a dangerous weapon under Minnesota Statutes section 
609.222, subdivision 1.18  The second-degree assault statute 
references section 609.02, subdivision 10, for the definition of 
assault.  Although subdivision 10 describes two forms of assault—an 
act committed with the intent to cause fear of bodily harm 
(“assault-fear”) and the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict 
bodily harm (“assault-harm”)19—the complaint in Fleck’s case did 
not specify a particular form of assault.20 
Fleck asserted a voluntary-intoxication defense21 and asked the 
trial court to provide the jury with a voluntary-intoxication 
instruction.22  The State objected to Fleck’s requested instruction, 
 
 15.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See MINN. STAT. § 169A.20, subdiv. 1(5) (2012) (stating that a person is 
guilty of driving while impaired if the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.08 or 
greater). 
 18.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306.  Second-degree assault is defined as follows: 
“Whoever assaults another with a dangerous weapon may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for not more than seven years or to payment of a fine of not more 
than $14,000, or both.”  § 609.222, subdiv. 1. 
 19.  See § 609.02, subdiv. 10. 
 20.  Criminal Complaint, State v. Fleck, No. 21-CR-09-239 (Douglas Cnty. Dist. 
Ct. Jan. 30, 2009). 
 21.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306.  For the language of section 609.075, see infra 
Part III.C.1.  Under this statute, which has essentially remained unchanged since 
its adoption in 1963, see State v. Bonga, 278 Minn. 181, 185–86, 153 N.W.2d 127, 
130 (1967), a defendant’s voluntary intoxication may be considered when 
determining whether the defendant had the requisite intent to commit a crime.  
See § 609.075; see also City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 466, 238 
N.W.2d 851, 854–55 (1976).  The defendant bears the burden of proving 
voluntary intoxication.  State v. O’Donnell, 280 Minn. 213, 221, 158 N.W.2d 699, 
704 (1968). 
 22.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306.  The pattern jury instruction for voluntary 
intoxication provides: 
In this case, the defendant has introduced evidence of intoxication.  It is 
not a defense to a crime that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of 
the act if the defendant voluntarily became intoxicated.  However, if it is 
an element of a crime that the defendant had a particular intent, you 
should consider whether the defendant was intoxicated, and if so, 
whether the defendant was capable of forming the required intent.  The 
5
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arguing that the voluntary-intoxication defense applies only to 
crimes with a specific-intent element.23  The State asked the court 
to instead instruct the jury only as to assault-harm, which the State 
characterized as a general-intent crime. 
The trial court agreed with the State’s argument that assault-
harm was a general-intent crime and, therefore, was ineligible for a 
voluntary-intoxication instruction.  Ultimately, the trial court 
instructed the jury that an assault can be committed in two ways—
by acting with intent to cause fear or by the intentional infliction of 
bodily harm—and gave the jury a voluntary-intoxication 
instruction.24  But the court advised the jury that the voluntary-
intoxication defense could only be considered to determine 
whether Fleck was guilty of committing assault-fear and could not 
apply to assault-harm.25  The trial court submitted separate verdict 
forms to the jury for each form of assault.26  The jury convicted 
Fleck of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, finding 
that he had committed assault-harm against K.W.  Fleck was 
sentenced to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment.27 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, 
reversed Fleck’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.28  Relying 
on recent precedent from the Minnesota Supreme Court that 
defined assault as a specific-intent crime, the court of appeals 
concluded that Fleck was entitled to a voluntary-intoxication 
 
burden of establishing intoxication is on the defendant.  The defendant 
must prove the claim of intoxication by the greater weight of the 
evidence.  The greater weight of the evidence means that the evidence 
must lead you to believe that it is more likely that the claim is true than 
not true.  If the evidence does not lead you to believe that it is more likely 
that the claim is true than not true, then the claim has not been proven. 
10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, 
MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CRIMINAL, CRIMJIG 7.03 
(Stephen A. Forestell & Wayne A. Logan reporters, 5th ed. 2006). 
 23.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306. 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  See id. 
 26.  See id.  The trial court also submitted to the jury verdict forms for the 
lesser-included offense of fifth-degree assault in addition to the charged offense of 
second-degree assault.  State v. Fleck, 797 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).  
The misdemeanor offense of fifth-degree assault is simply an assault as defined by 
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 10.  Compare § 609.224, subdiv. 1 
(defining fifth-degree assault), with id. § 609.02, subdiv. 10. 
 27.  See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 306.  That sentence was the presumptive term for 
second-degree assault under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.  See id. 
 28.  Fleck, 797 N.W.2d at 739. 
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instruction for both forms of assault.29  The State appealed to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, which granted the State’s petition for 
review.30 
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
1. The Defense of Voluntary Intoxication Is Only Available for 
Specific-Intent Crimes 
The Minnesota Supreme Court first considered whether the 
statutory defense of voluntary intoxication applies to both general-
intent and specific-intent crimes.31  To decide this question, the 
court referred to the language of the voluntary-intoxication 
statute.32  Minnesota Statutes section 609.075 provides: 
An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication 
is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a 
particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary 
element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of 
intoxication may be taken into consideration in 
determining such intent or state of mind. 
Engaging in a plain-language analysis of the statute, the 
supreme court focused on the term “particular intent.”33  The court 
found that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “particular” 
is consistent with “specific” and inconsistent with “general.”34  The 
court further noted that in its past decisions, the terms “particular 
intent” and “specific intent” were used interchangeably.35  The 
court concluded, therefore, that the term “particular intent,” as 
used in the voluntary-intoxication statute, refers only to specific-
intent crimes.36  Stated otherwise, voluntary intoxication is only 
 
 29.  Id. at 737–38 (discussing State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 656–57 (Minn. 
2007); State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn. 1998)). 
 30.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 307. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1119 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 35.  Id. (citing State v. Torres, 632 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 2001); City of 
Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 466, 238 N.W.2d 851, 854–55 (1976)). 
 36.  Id.  On appeal, Fleck conceded that voluntary intoxication applies only to 
specific-intent crimes.  Brief for Appellant at 15, State v. Fleck, 797 N.W.2d 733 
(Minn. Oct. 1, 2010) (No. A10-0681), 2010 WL 6644665.  It could be argued, 
however, that the phrase “or other state of mind,” which follows “particular intent” 
in the voluntary-intoxication statute, in fact permits the use of the voluntary-
intoxication defense for crimes requiring any mental state, including general 
intent.  See MINN. STAT. § 609.075 (2012). 
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available as a defense to those offenses that require proof of 
specific intent. 
2. Assault-Harm Is a General-Intent Crime 
The supreme court then turned to Minnesota’s assault statute 
to determine whether it describes a specific- or general-intent 
crime.37  Citing several treatises, the court stated that a general-
intent crime “simply prohibits a person from intentionally 
engaging in the prohibited conduct.”38  The person must intend 
the action but need not intend to accomplish any particular 
result.39  By contrast, “a specific-intent crime requires an ‘intent to 
cause a particular result.’”40  Specific intent refers to a mental state 
that is above and beyond the mere will to engage in the act itself.41  
The supreme court remarked that the legislature regularly uses the 
phrase “with intent to” as a means of expressing a specific-intent 
requirement.42 
Turning to the definition of assault, the supreme court first 
noted that section 609.02, subdivision 10, sets forth two definitions 
of assault.  The supreme court paid close attention to the statutory 
definition of each, noting that assault-fear is “‘an act done with 
intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or 
death’”43 and assault-harm is “‘the intentional infliction of . . . 
bodily harm upon another.’”44  The court took special notice of the 
fact that the legislature used different language regarding intent 
when defining the two types of assault.45  Relying in large part on 
the fact that the legislature used the phrase “with intent to”—a 
signal phrase for specific intent—only when defining assault-fear, 
 
 37.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308. 
 38.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 39.  Id. (citing 9 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 44.3 (3d ed. 2001)). 
 40.  Id. (quoting MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 39, § 44.3). 
 41.  Id. (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(e) (2d 
ed. 2003)). 
 42.  Id. at 308–09 (citing State v. Mullen, 577 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn. 1998)).  
In Mullen, the court observed that the language referencing specific intent 
includes “‘intentionally,’ ‘with intent to,’ or ‘know.’”  577 N.W.2d at 510 (citing 
State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 73–74 (Minn. 1996), superseded by statute, MINN. 
STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 1(a) (1997), as recognized in Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 311 n.4).   
 43.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 10(1) 
(2010)). 
 44.  Id. (quoting § 609.02, subdiv. 10(2)). 
 45.  Id. 
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the court concluded that assault-harm is a general-intent crime.46  
The court stated: 
Although the definition of assault-harm requires the State 
to prove that the defendant intended to do the physical 
act, nothing in the definition requires proof that the 
defendant meant to violate the law or cause a particular 
result.  If the Legislature intended to require an 
additional, special mental element, it could have defined 
assault-harm as “an act done with the intent to cause bodily 
harm to another.”47 
Having previously held that voluntary intoxication is a defense to 
only those crimes requiring specific intent, the court held that the 
trial court properly instructed the jury and reinstated Fleck’s 
conviction for second-degree assault with a deadly weapon.48 
3. To the Extent that Other Minnesota Supreme Court Decisions 
Suggested that Assault-Harm Is a Specific-Intent Crime, Those 
Decisions Were Incorrect 
In the final third of its opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
conceded that “imprecise language” in some of its prior opinions 
led to “some confusion in the law.”49  As the court of appeals 
observed, the supreme court held in State v. Lindahl50 that “force” in 
the context of a criminal-sexual-conduct offense, which the 
legislature defined as an assault, required just general intent.51  But 
the court of appeals relied on two more recent cases, State v. 
Edrozo52 and State v. Vance,53 in which the supreme court explicitly 
stated that assault-harm was a specific-intent offense.54 
Reviewing these cases in Fleck, the supreme court first 
reaffirmed the analysis set forth in Lindahl.55  Lindahl was charged 
with criminal sexual conduct involving force.56  The term “force” 
 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 309 (emphasis added). 
 48.  Id. at 312. 
 49.  Id. at 310. 
 50.  309 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1981). 
 51.  State v. Fleck, 797 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing 
Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 767). 
 52.  578 N.W.2d 719 (Minn. 1998). 
 53.  734 N.W.2d 650 (Minn. 2007). 
 54.  Fleck, 797 N.W.2d at 737–38 (citing Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d at 723; Vance, 734 
N.W.2d at 656, 657). 
 55.  State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. 2012). 
 56.  Id. (citing Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 764). 
9
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was defined as the commission of an assault or threat of an assault.57  
On appeal, Lindahl argued that he should have received a 
voluntary-intoxication instruction.58  The supreme court disagreed, 
holding that the assault at issue, which involved the infliction of 
harm, was a general-intent crime: “‘[A]n assault involving infliction 
of injury of some sort requires no abstract intent to do something 
further, only an intent to do the prohibited physical act of 
committing a battery.’”59  Although the court in Fleck acknowledged 
that Lindahl involved criminal sexual conduct and did not 
specifically address the separate offense of assault, the court 
observed that the reasoning of the decision was sound.60  Thus, the 
court concluded, the holding of Lindahl should be extended to 
cases involving assault-harm.61 
Next, the court highlighted the factual circumstances in Edrozo 
and Vance in an effort to explain their inconsistency with Lindahl.62  
The court reasoned that under the facts of Edrozo, which involved 
allegations of just assault-fear, the court’s statement that “[a]ssault 
is a specific-intent crime” encompassed only the assault-fear offense 
and not assault-harm.63  In other words, in Edrozo, the court spoke 
too broadly.64 
The court acknowledged that its analysis in Vance was likewise 
inexact.65  At trial, Vance relied on a defense of accident, claiming 
that he injured the victim when he fell on top of her.66  On appeal, 
Vance argued that the trial court committed reversible error in 
failing to provide the jury with a definition of assault, which 
requires an intentional act.67  The supreme court agreed, noting 
again that assault-harm was a specific-intent crime and holding that 
the trial court’s erroneous instruction, which did not contain any 
intent requirement, necessitated a new trial.68 
The Fleck court recognized that Vance incorrectly stated that 
 
 57.  Id. (citing Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 767). 
 58.  Id. (citing Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 766). 
 59.  Id. (quoting Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 767). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 310–12. 
 63.  Id. at 311 (quoting State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn. 1998)). 
 64.  See id. 
 65.  See id. at 311–12. 
 66.  Id. at 311 (citing State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 654 (Minn. 2007)). 
 67.  See id. (citing Vance, 734 N.W.2d at 657, 662–63). 
 68.  Id. (citing Vance, 734 N.W.2d at 662–63). 
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both assault-fear and assault-harm were specific-intent crimes.69  But 
the court explained that its “chief concern [in Vance] was that the 
erroneous jury instruction allowed the jury to find Vance guilty of 
an assault-harm offense even if they believed the victim’s injuries 
were the result of Vance’s nonvolitional act—accidentally falling on 
the victim.”70  The outcome of Vance was therefore correct, even 
though the court relied on a faulty premise in arriving at the 
result.71 
Because the court distinguished its analyses in Edrozo and Vance 
from its holding in Fleck, the court declined to specifically overrule 
either decision.72  The court noted, however, that the confusion 
created by the past decisions “is regrettable”73 and explicitly 
rejected the “erroneous discussion of specific-intent and general-
intent crimes in Vance.”74 
IV. PROBLEMATIC EFFECTS OF THE COURT’S RULING IN FLECK 
On a positive note, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in 
Fleck avoided the domestic-assault policy concerns that could have 
resulted if defendants charged with assault-harm were permitted to 
argue voluntary intoxication as a defense.75  But in almost all other 
respects, the court’s opinion in Fleck is troubling in both theory and 
practice.  First, the court’s statutory analysis of the definition of 
assault-harm did not address all of the language in the statute.  
Second, the court in effect made assault-harm a strict-liability crime 
by failing to impose a mens rea requirement for each element of 
the offense and by conflating the principles of general intent and 
volitional acts.  In creating a strict-liability crime, the court 
essentially criminalized all physical acts that result in harm to 
 
 69.  Id. at 311–12. 
 70.  Id. at 312. 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  See id. at 311–12. 
 73.  Id. at 311 n.4. 
 74.  Id. at 311. 
 75.  In their amicus brief, the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women, the 
Battered Women’s Legal Advocacy Project, and the Battered Women’s Justice 
Project cited research from the U.S. Department of Justice purporting that more 
than one-third of offenders incarcerated for violent crimes were using alcohol at 
the time of their arrest.  See Brief for Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women et 
al., supra note 4, at 8.  The amici argued that “[a] cultural tendency to trivialize 
domestic violence, especially when the abuser has been drinking, further suggests 
that juries will acquit many defendants accused of domestic assault who invoke the 
intoxication defense.”  Id. at 10–11 (citation omitted). 
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another person, regardless of the intent or motivations of the actor.  
A third problem with Fleck, therefore, is that the court’s broad 
definition of assault could have far-reaching effects on other areas 
of the law, such as civil suits for assault and battery, homicide cases, 
and administrative law procedures. 
A. Incomplete Statutory Interpretation 
Fleck presents an abbreviated analysis of Minnesota Statutes 
section 609.02, subdivision 10.76  In finding that assault-harm 
constitutes a general-intent crime, the court simply states, “The 
forbidden conduct is a physical act, which results in bodily harm 
upon another.”77  But the language of section 609.02, subdivision 
10(2), in fact states: “‘Assault’ is . . . the intentional infliction of . . . 
bodily harm upon another.”  The court’s conclusion that “[t]he 
forbidden conduct is a physical act”78 ignores the statute’s plain 
language requiring a showing of “intentional infliction.”79 
First, given that the court found the legislature’s use of “with 
intent to” in the assault-fear definition to mean that the legislature 
intended to make assault-fear a specific-intent crime,80 it is unclear 
why the use of the word “intentional” did not do the same for 
assault-harm.  Under Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 
9(1), the terms “with intent to” and “intentionally” are both 
indications that “criminal intent is an element of a crime.”  Both 
terms have almost identical definitions,81 and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has found that both “with intent to” and 
“intentionally” are references to specific intent.82  The court in Fleck 
did not address the definition of “intentionally” set out in section 
609.02, subdivision 9, nor did it explain why the adverb 
“intentionally” signifies a specific-intent requirement but the 
adjective form of “intentional” found in section 609.02, subdivision 
10, does not. 
Second, the word “inflict” is a transitive verb,83 so it requires a 
 
 76.  See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 309–10. 
 77.  Id. at 309. 
 78.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 79.  MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 10(2) (2010). 
 80.  See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308–09, 308 n.3. 
 81.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 9(3) (2012), with id. § 609.02, 
subdiv. 9(4); see also Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308 n.3. 
 82.  See State v. Mullen, 577 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn. 1998) (citation omitted). 
 83.  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 900 (5th 
ed. 2011). 
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direct object in order to complete its meaning—a person inflicts 
something.  Therefore, “infliction” is not just “a physical act”; it is 
defined as “[t]he act or process of imposing or meting out 
something unpleasant.”84  The assault definition provides the 
“something unpleasant” that is inflicted—bodily harm.85  
Therefore, the plain meaning of section 609.02, subdivision 10(2), 
is that an assault is the intentional act or process of imposing or 
meting out bodily harm upon another.  And the conduct that is 
prohibited is imposing bodily harm upon another, not just a physical act. 
Recognizing that section 609.02, subdivision 10(2), prohibits 
the act of imposing bodily harm, the question of whether assault-
harm is a general- or specific-intent crime becomes more difficult.  
The court in Fleck cited definitions of “general intent” from several 
sources.86  These definitions all state something a bit different, 
creating confusion about the meaning that the court was 
attributing to “general intent.”  And the definition the court cited 
from LaFave’s seminal treatise on criminal law—that general intent 
requires only an “intention to make the bodily movement which 
constitutes the act which the crime requires”87—is the same 
principle that the court later cites as a requirement for both 
general and specific intent: that every crime requires a volitional 
act.88 
Fleck concludes that “the definition of assault-harm requires 
the State to prove that the defendant intended to do the physical 
act.”89  The physical act is the conduct forbidden by the plain 
language of the statute—imposing or meting out bodily harm upon 
another.  So assault-harm requires the State to prove that the 
defendant intended to impose or mete out bodily harm to another.  
One could invoke LaFave’s broad definition of general intent and 
 
 84.  Id. at 900–01. 
 85.  § 609.02, subdiv. 10(2).  It would be either redundant or absurd to say 
that an assault is the intentional act of imposing something unpleasant that results 
in bodily harm.  If the act is unpleasant because it results in pain, to add a bodily 
harm requirement is redundant.  And it is absurd to think that unpleasantness 
associated with any other sensations (e.g., aural unpleasantness from a 
neighboring residence) could constitute assault. 
 86.  See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308. 
 87.  Id. (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 41). 
 88.  Id. at 309 (citing MCCARR & NORBY, supra note 39, § 44.5).  In fact, 
LaFave’s own treatise uses the phrase quoted in Fleck when discussing the volitional 
requirement applicable to all crimes and two paragraphs later when discussing 
general intent.  See LAFAVE, supra note 41. 
 89.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 309. 
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say that assault-harm is a general-intent crime that merely requires 
the intent to make the bodily movement underlying the imposition 
of bodily harm.90  But the more obvious interpretation of the 
definition is its plain language—that assault-harm requires the 
State to prove that the defendant intended to impose or mete out 
bodily harm upon another.  Requiring the State to show that the 
defendant intended to impose bodily harm makes assault-harm a 
specific-intent crime because the defendant must intend the result 
of his or her action. 
B. Assault-Harm as a Strict-Liability Crime 
Much of the difficulty in characterizing assault-harm as either a 
general- or specific-intent crime stems from the fact that, 
historically, those terms were used in different ways to mean 
different things and then repurposed to the point that the United 
States Supreme Court has called the distinction “ambiguous and 
elastic” and “[a] source of a good deal of confusion.”91  In addition, 
some of the court’s difficulty is the result of its failure to recognize, 
as the Model Penal Code does, that mens rea should be required 
for every element of a crime.92 
Assault-harm has two basic elements (in addition to the 
general principle of all crimes requiring a person to act 
volitionally): a conduct element and a result element.  Fleck 
established a general-intent requirement with respect to the 
conduct element but did not impose any mens rea requirement as 
to the result element.  Therefore, under Fleck, if a defendant 
performs a physical act of his own volition, his act constitutes an 
assault-harm if it results in harm to another person, regardless of 
whether the defendant had any desire to harm another.  In other 
words, the court’s decision effectively made assault-harm a strict-
liability crime.93 
 
 90.  See LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 5.2(e). 
 91.  United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403–04 (1980). 
 92.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1985) (“[A] person is not guilty of an 
offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law 
may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.”); see also Bailey, 
444 U.S. at 406 (“‘[C]lear analysis requires that the question of the kind of 
culpability required to establish the commission of an offense be faced separately 
with respect to each material element of the crime.’”) (quoting MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02 cmt. 1)). 
 93.  Some commentators argue that there is no distinction between general-
intent and specific-intent crimes.  See, e.g., MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 39, § 44.5 
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A strict-liability crime is one that imposes criminal liability in 
the absence of mens rea.94  As the Minnesota Supreme Court 
recently noted, “The Supreme Court of the United States has stated 
that ‘offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored.’”95  
Under an elemental approach to mens rea, the court in Fleck 
undoubtedly imposed strict liability on the result element of 
assault-harm.  And although the court described the mens rea 
requirement for the conduct element as general intent, the low 
burden of proof Fleck placed upon the State is consistent with strict 
liability. 
“Mens rea is the element of a crime that requires ‘the 
defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal.’”96  Because 
the supreme court in Fleck defined the prohibited conduct for 
assault-harm in terms of the effect that a physical act has on another 
person, the fact that makes the defendant’s conduct illegal is the 
harm suffered by the victim.  Because any harm the defendant 
causes must necessarily follow after the defendant’s act, it is 
impossible for the defendant to know, at the time of the act, the 
facts that make his conduct illegal.  Therefore, the supreme court’s 
definition of assault-harm in Fleck lacks a mens rea requirement. 
The court’s conclusion that assault-harm requires general 
intent overlooks the fact that the only form of “intent” that the 
State must prove is that the defendant’s actions were not 
involuntary reflexes.  That volitional element is not a mens rea 
requirement but the basic requirement that a crime include an 
act.97  As the court itself stated in Fleck, “regardless of whether an 
offense is described as a specific- or general-intent crime, a 
defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail to perform 
an act.”98  But the court nonetheless went on to conflate the 
principle of general intent and the universal requirement of a 
 
(“‘[S]trict liability’ offenses are often merely ‘general intent’ crimes, since they 
assume that the act itself was done intentionally and consciously; otherwise it is 
likely to be defensible as mere accident, or as the result of mental illness.” 
(footnote omitted)).  Regardless of the terminology employed, imposing liability 
in the absence of fault is generally disfavored.  See State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d 
816, 818 (Minn. 2012) (citations omitted). 
 94.  See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994); see also LAFAVE, 
supra note 41, § 5.5. 
 95.  Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 818 (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 606). 
 96.  Id. (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 605). 
 97.  See LAFAVE, supra note 41, §§ 5.2(e), 6.1. 
 98.  State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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volitional act, requiring only the latter but labeling it as the former.  
Assault-harm, under Fleck, therefore, requires no actual showing of 
mens rea and is thus a strict-liability crime. 
C. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine 
Under Fleck, an assault-harm crime occurs when a defendant 
commits any physical act of the defendant’s own volition that 
results in bodily harm to another person, regardless of the 
defendant’s underlying desire, intent, or motive.  That holding 
does not adequately define the conduct prohibited under 
Minnesota’s assault statutes.  The court stated, “The forbidden 
conduct is a physical act, which results in bodily harm upon 
another.”99  “[A] physical act” encompasses all conduct.  Although 
some provisions among the assault statutes require more specific 
conduct—i.e., a past pattern of child abuse,100 use of a deadly 
weapon,101 the transfer of bodily fluids or feces102—others simply 
prohibit an “assault” as defined in section 609.02, subdivision 10.103  
Under Fleck, whether a person’s conduct constitutes an assault 
depends solely upon its effect on others.104  And because 
prohibition of “a physical act” covers such a broad range of 
conduct, a person cannot know for certain whether his conduct was 
prohibited until after he has acted and observed the effects of his 
conduct. 
Uncertainty in criminal statutes can violate the “due process 
standards of definiteness under both the United States 
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution.”105  Just prosecution 
requires fair notice to the offender that his conduct is forbidden by 
statute.106  To ensure fair notice, criminal statutes may be 
challenged as unconstitutionally vague.  The void-for-vagueness 
doctrine requires that criminal statutes define an offense (1) with 
sufficient clarity and certainty that a person of ordinary intelligence 
can understand what conduct is prohibited and (2) in a manner 
 
 99.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 100.  MINN. STAT. § 609.223, subdiv. 2 (2012). 
 101.  Id. § 609.222. 
 102.  Id. § 609.2231, subdiv. 3(2). 
 103.  See id. §§ 609.221, subdiv. 1; .223, subdiv. 1; .224, subdiv. 1(2). 
 104.  Cf. State v. Ott, 291 Minn. 72, 75, 189 N.W.2d 377, 379 (1971) (noting 
that, in the assault-fear statute, “the intent of the actor, as contrasted with the 
effect upon the victim, becomes the focal point for inquiry”). 
 105.  State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1985). 
 106.  See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). 
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that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
of the law.107 
Under Fleck, it is questionable whether assault-harm crimes 
meet both prongs of the void-for-vagueness test.  Because assault-
harm is an act that results in bodily harm to another, a person 
cannot know whether his conduct is prohibited until he knows the 
effect of that conduct.  And the potentially limitless spectrum of 
conduct encompassed within the court’s definition of assault-harm 
in Fleck requires law enforcement to exercise a great deal of 
discretion, which could lead to arbitrary or varying degrees of 
enforcement. 
Granted, in most circumstances, an individual can predict 
whether his or her act will inflict harm on another.  Nevertheless, it 
is not hard to imagine factual scenarios in which a person’s 
innocent actions result in bodily harm to another.  For example, 
assume a defendant is walking through a crowded shopping mall 
and trying to pass a slower customer.  The defendant pushes past 
the slower customer, who is caught off-balance and falls, breaking 
his or her leg.  Had the customer not fallen, the defendant’s 
conduct would have been lawful.  But pursuant to Fleck, the 
defendant committed assault-harm; depending on the amount of 
harm the customer suffered, the defendant could be charged with 
first-, third-, or fifth-degree assault.108  It is irrelevant whether the 
defendant intended to cause injury to the other customer; it may 
even be irrelevant whether the defendant intended to push the 
other customer, so long as the defendant was walking past the 
customer of his or her own volition. 
D. Potential Collateral Consequences of Fleck 
The example in the previous section highlights the absurd 
results that may stem from the lack of a mens rea requirement and 
the broad definition of assault-harm that the court announced in 
Fleck.  This section illustrates the effect the court’s decision could 
have in other areas of the law, including civil suits, felony-murder 
prosecutions, and administrative law provisions. 
 
 107.  See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); accord State v. 
Bussman, 741 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Minn. 2007). 
 108.  See §§ 609.221, subdiv. 1 (defining first-degree assault to require “great 
bodily harm”), .223, subdiv. 1 (defining third-degree assault to require “substantial 
bodily harm”), .224, subdiv. 1 (requiring only “bodily harm” for fifth-degree 
assault). 
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1. Civil Suits for Tortious Assault 
The court’s decision in Fleck will make it easier to convict a 
defendant of assault-harm because, beyond establishing that the 
defendant’s conduct was volitional, the State does not need to 
address the defendant’s mental state.  That change could affect 
civil actions seeking damages from the defendant for assault 
and/or battery.  The common law tort of assault does not involve 
physical contact between the parties; instead, assault is “an unlawful 
threat to do bodily harm to another with present ability to carry the 
threat into effect.”109  Common law battery, on the other hand, is an 
intentional, unpermitted, harmful, or offensive contact with 
another person.110  In other words, the tort of assault is assault-fear 
as defined in Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 10(1), 
and assault-harm under that statute is more akin to the common 
law tort of battery.111 
In cases where a criminal defendant was convicted of a crime 
against a person and the victim or, in actions for wrongful death, 
the victim’s family files suit for civil damages arising from the 
defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff often moves for summary 
judgment or partial summary judgment on the issue of the 
defendant’s liability.  These motions are based on the legal theory 
of collateral estoppel, which “precludes the relitigation of issues 
which are both identical to those issues already litigated by the 
parties in a prior action and necessary and essential to the resulting 
judgment.”112  “A criminal conviction can be used in a subsequent 
civil action to preclude argument by the convicted party on issues 
 
 109.  Dahlin v. Fraser, 206 Minn. 476, 478, 288 N.W. 851, 852 (1939). 
 110.  See Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Minn. 1990); 4A MINN. DIST. 
JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY 
INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL, CIVJIG 60.25 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp 
reporters, 5th ed. 2012). 
 111.  See State v. Ott, 291 Minn. 72, 75, 189 N.W.2d 377, 379 n.3 (1971) 
(noting that the assault statute “punishes without distinction both what the 
common law regarded as ‘criminal assault’ and what was known as ‘civil assault’”).  
At common law, an assault was simply an attempted battery.  See Rollin M. Perkins, 
An Analysis of Assault and Attempts to Assault, 47 MINN. L. REV. 71, 71 (1963); see also 
Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 205, 208 N.W. 814, 815 (1926) (“An assault is 
an inchoate battery.”).  Consequently, the commission of a battery necessarily 
included a completed assault.  Perkins, supra, at 73.  Rather than charging 
defendants with assault and battery, many jurisdictions merged the two crimes 
together.  Id. at 89. 
 112.  Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 
(Minn. 1982). 
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conclusively proved in the criminal trial.”113  Because collateral 
estoppel is an equitable doctrine, the court can use its discretion 
when deciding whether to apply collateral estoppel to any given 
case.114  Courts generally invoke collateral estoppel when all of the 
following factors are present: (1) the issue to be decided is identical 
to one adjudicated in a prior action, (2) the prior action concluded 
with a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party to be estopped 
was a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party to be 
estopped had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue at 
the prior proceeding.115 
If a victim sues a defendant who was convicted of a crime 
involving assault-harm, the last three prerequisites for collateral 
estoppel will almost certainly be present.  The defendant would 
have been a party in the criminal case against him and would have 
had an opportunity to dispute the charges at trial.116  And the court 
would have entered judgment against the defendant at the time of 
his sentencing.117  The question that will remain for the court is 
whether a crime involving assault-harm, as defined in Fleck and 
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 10(2), is sufficiently 
similar to the tort of battery to consider the matter already decided. 
Pursuant to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
assault-harm in Fleck, a defendant can be convicted of a crime 
involving assault-harm if the defendant committed a voluntary act 
that resulted in bodily harm upon another.  As previously 
discussed, assault-harm does not require “proof that the defendant 
meant to violate the law or cause a particular result.”118  On the civil 
 
 113.  Fain v. Andersen, 816 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); see also Ill. 
Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. 2003); Travelers Ins. Co. v. 
Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 552–53, 163 N.W.2d 289, 293 (1968); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 cmt. e (1982) (“There are two basic patterns for 
applying issue preclusion in favor of a third party. . . .  [One] situation is where the 
person harmed by the conduct that was criminally prosecuted then brings an 
action for civil redress against the wrongdoer for the consequences of the 
conduct. . . .  Although the courts were somewhat slower in coming to apply issue 
preclusion in the latter situation than in the former, it is now settled that 
preclusion should apply in both.”). 
 114.  See Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 662 N.W.2d at 532; Green v. City of Coon Rapids, 
485 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 115.  See Fain, 816 N.W.2d at 701. 
 116.  See id. at 702. 
 117.  See id. at 701 (citing Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 
N.W.2d 209, 220 (Minn. 2007)) (“A judgment is final, for purposes of res judicata, 
when entered, notwithstanding a pending appeal.”). 
 118.  State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012). 
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side, a defendant is liable for a battery if the defendant 
intentionally caused harmful or offensive contact with another.119  
With respect to intentional torts, the term “intent” means “that the 
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes 
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”120  
Therefore, to be liable for battery, the defendant must intend to 
cause a harmful or offensive contact, or the circumstances must be 
such that the defendant’s intent can be inferred.121  Because battery 
requires the plaintiff to prove intent to cause a result—an element 
not present in the definition of assault-harm under Fleck—a 
conviction for a crime involving assault-harm is not identical to civil 
liability for battery.  For that reason, a defendant convicted of an 
assault-harm offense should not be precluded from arguing his 
innocence during a subsequent civil trial.  Courts, therefore, will be 
more likely to deny summary judgment motions based on collateral 
estoppel, requiring the court and the parties to expend additional 
resources to relitigate the issue of the defendant’s liability. 
2. Felony Murder 
In addition to the possible civil consequences stemming from 
an assault conviction, the relaxed standards promulgated in Fleck 
could affect criminal charging practices and plea bargaining.  As an 
example, it is not uncommon for prosecutors to either charge or 
submit a lesser-included instruction to the jury for felony murder 
when the defendant is charged with other felonies and first-degree 
murder.  In that scenario, if the prosecution did not meet its 
burden of proof on the more severe charges, the felony-murder 
charge permits the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder on 
the basis of the defendant’s other felonious acts. 
According to common law, “‘if one intends to do another 
felony, and undesignedly kills a man, this is also murder.’”122  
 
 119.  4A MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, 
supra note 110. 
 120.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965); accord 4A MINN. DIST. 
JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY 
INSTRUCTION GUIDES–CIVIL, CIVJIG 60.10 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp 
reporters, 5th ed. 2006). 
 121.  See, e.g., R.W. v. T.F., 528 N.W.2d 869, 872 (Minn. 1995) (explaining the 
intent element of a battery claim and noting that the defendant’s intent to cause a 
result was the relevant intent inquiry rather than the defendant’s intent to act). 
 122.  State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Rudolph 
J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763, 
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Minnesota codified that principle as second-degree felony murder.  
A defendant may be found guilty of second-degree felony murder if 
he or she “causes the death of a human being, without intent to 
effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to 
commit a felony offense.”123  Second-degree felony murder has no 
intent requirement.124  To find a defendant guilty of second-degree 
felony murder, the prosecution need only prove that (1) the 
defendant’s conduct caused the victim’s death and (2) at the time 
of causing the death, the defendant was committing, or attempting 
to commit, a proper predicate felony offense.125 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly held that assault 
is a proper predicate offense to second-degree felony murder.126  
Applying the court’s ruling in Fleck to a charge of second-degree 
felony murder while committing second-degree assault—the 
degree of assault charged in Fleck—the prosecution can convict a 
defendant upon proof of only five broad elements: (1) the 
defendant caused the victim’s death127 (2) while committing 
second-degree assault,128 which requires proof that (3) the 
defendant acted as a result of his or her free will129 and (4) inflicted 
bodily harm upon another130 (5) while using a dangerous 
weapon.131  Pursuant to Fleck, the only mental state that the 
prosecution must prove is the defendant’s exercise of free will, 
which is lacking only in those rare instances of reflexive twitches 
 
765 (1999) (quoting SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 947 (George Chase ed., 4th ed. 1938))). 
 123.  MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subdiv. 2(1) (2012). 
 124.  State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 51 (Minn. 1996).  The CRIMJIG for second-
degree felony murder includes the following instruction to the jury: “It is not 
necessary for the State to prove the defendant had an intent to effect the death of 
[the victim], but it must prove that defendant committed or attempted to commit 
the underlying felony.”  10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 22, at 11.30. 
 125.  See 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, supra note 22. 
 126.  See, e.g., Cole, 542 N.W.2d at 53; State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 833–34 
(Minn. 1987); State v. Galvan, 374 N.W.2d 269, 270 (Minn. 1985); State v. Nurmi, 
336 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Minn. 1983). 
 127.  See 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, supra note 22. 
 128.  See id. 
 129.  State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012). 
 130.  10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, supra note 22, at 13.10. 
 131.  See id. 
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and defective car brakes.132 
The fact that Fleck has essentially transformed assault-harm into 
a strict-liability crime is particularly concerning in the context of 
felony murder because the offense of second-degree felony murder 
has no intent requirement.133  Instead, the “felony murder rule” 
says that because the defendant committed a felony that posed a 
special danger to human life, the law will impute malice in the 
defendant’s conduct that unintentionally caused the victim’s 
death.134  In other words, the felony murder rule “regards the 
commission of a felony as conclusive evidence of homicidal 
malice.”135  But according to Fleck, a person whose volitional 
conduct causes bodily harm to another is guilty of assault-harm, 
even if the defendant’s actions were both legal and lacking any 
intent to harm the other person.  It is illogical to reason that the 
commission of a benign, lawful act proves homicidal malice, 
particularly when the court has previously stated that “a person is 
deemed malicious when he does an act intending to injure another.”136 
Returning to the example of the hasty shopper, assume the 
defendant volitionally pushed past the other customer, who fell 
and sustained a fatal head injury.  Despite the fact that the 
defendant did not intend to inflict any harm upon the victim, the 
defendant could be charged with unintentional felony murder with 
a predicate offense of first-degree assault.137  And from the single 
volitional act of pushing past the customer, the law presumes the 
defendant acted with homicidal malice. 
 
 132.  Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 309. 
 133.  See State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d. 880, 882 (Minn. 1992) (“[F]elony 
murder remains an anomaly in the law of homicide.  With the exception of 
involuntary manslaughter, . . . it is the only form of homicide not requiring proof 
of a specific mental element.”). 
 134.  See State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 51 (Minn. 1996) (citing Branson, 487 
N.W.2d at 881).  Note that imputing malice in the defendant’s conduct is distinct 
from the doctrine of transferred intent.  In the latter, the intent requirement of 
Crime A serves as a substitute for the intent requirement of Crime B.  But 
imputing malice presumes the existence of the mental state required for Crime B 
from the commission of Crime A.  Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-
Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 455–56 
(1985). 
 135.  Michael C. Gregerson, Note, Criminal Law—Dangerous, Not Deadly: 
Possession of a Firearm Distinguished from Use Under the Felony-Murder Rule—State v. 
Anderson, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 607, 611 (2004) (citing George P. Fletcher, 
Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 415–16 (1980)). 
 136.  State v. Jankowitz, 175 Minn. 409, 410, 221 N.W. 533, 533 (1928) 
(emphasis added). 
 137.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.19, subdiv. 2(1), .221, subdiv. 1 (2012). 
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But precedential case law places a gloss on the statutory 
language of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 2(1), 
that may restrain absurd results from Fleck.  The plain language of 
the second-degree felony murder statute appears to authorize all 
but three felonies as predicate offenses.138  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court, however, has held that predicate crimes for felony murder 
must pose a “special danger to human life.”139  When deciding 
whether a particular felony constitutes a special danger to human 
life, the court examines the crime from two perspectives: (1) the 
elements of the felony in the abstract and (2) the facts of that 
particular case and the circumstances surrounding the commission 
of the felony.140  For example, in State v. Anderson, the supreme 
court distinguished between possession of a firearm by an ineligible 
person and actual use of a firearm.141  Because the former “does not 
require an act of violence in carrying out the crime,” the court held 
that the offense of felon in possession of a firearm was not a 
predicate offense to second-degree felony murder.142  Although 
assault-harm, as a crime against the person, will always contain 
elements indicative of a special danger to human life,143 the court 
will apparently also consider the specific circumstances of the 
crime and the acts of the offender.  That gloss may discourage 
more liberal and creative charging under section 609.19, 
subdivision 2(1), in the wake of Fleck. 
Additionally, the fact that a defendant could be convicted of 
second-degree felony murder for acting without malice could affect 
the use of lesser-included offenses, such as manslaughter.  “A lesser 
offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if it is impossible 
to commit the latter without also committing the former.”144  In 
Minnesota, every lesser degree of homicide is a lesser-included 
 
 138.  Explicitly excluded from the possible predicate felonies for second-
degree felony murder are those crimes that serve as predicates to first-degree 
felony murder—criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force 
or violence, or a drive-by shooting.  See id. §§ 609.19, subdiv. 2(1) (second-degree 
felony murder), .185(a) (first-degree felony murder). 
 139.  See State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 1983); accord State v. 
Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 700–01 (Minn. 2003). 
 140.  Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. (quoting with approval the district court’s order). 
 143.  See State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 53 (Minn. 1996) (“[A]ssault in the 
second degree itself forms a proper predicate felony to a felony murder 
conviction—assault is not a property crime, but a crime against the person.”). 
 144.  State v. Roden, 384 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Minn. 1986). 
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offense.145  Specifically, first- and second-degree manslaughter and 
third-degree murder are lesser-included offenses of felony 
murder.146  Theoretically, then, a person who committed second-
degree felony murder must have also committed third-degree 
murder and first- and second-degree manslaughter.  But unlike a 
charge of unintentional murder while committing an assault, most 
lesser-included offenses each have some requirement of a guilty 
mind, such as a depraved mind, the heat of passion, or 
negligence.147  Therefore, a defendant charged with second-degree 
murder while committing an assault will have unusually limited 
opportunities for instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses.148 
 
 145.  See MINN. STAT. § 609.04, subdiv. 1 (2012) (stating that a lesser-included 
offense may be a lesser degree of the same crime); State v. Leinweber, 303 Minn. 
414, 421, 228 N.W.2d 120, 125 (1975); accord Cole, 542 N.W.2d at 50. 
 146.  See, e.g., State v. Grigsby, 818 N.W.2d 511, 518–19 (Minn. 2012) (stating 
that second-degree manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of second-degree 
felony murder); State v. Peou, 579 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. 1998) (“[T]here is no 
question that first-degree manslaughter is an included offense within the charge of 
felony murder. . . .”). 
 147.  See §§ 609.195(a), .20(1), .205(1), (3). 
 148.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals faced a related and interesting problem 
in the recent case of State v. Rubio-Segura, No. A11-2246, 2012 WL 5381843 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2012).  The appellant’s argument noted that the crimes of 
second-degree murder while committing a felony assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, 
subdiv. 2(1) (2008), and first-degree manslaughter while committing a 
misdemeanor assault, id. § 609.20(2), are identical.  Rubio-Segura, 2012 WL 
5381843, at *2.  Under both statutes, the State must prove that the defendant, in 
committing an assault—a volitional physical act that resulted in some degree of 
bodily harm—caused the death of another.  See 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, 
COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 22, at 11.29, 11.46.  The 
only difference between the two crimes is the degree of bodily force inflicted—
misdemeanor assault under Minnesota Statutes section 609.224, subdivision 1(2), 
requires the infliction of bodily harm, and felony assault under Minnesota Statutes 
section 609.221, subdivision 1, requires the infliction of great bodily harm.  But, as 
the appellant in Rubio-Segura argued, the fact that the homicide and manslaughter 
charges require the assault to have caused the victim’s death, the degree of bodily 
harm inflicted must necessarily have been “great” as defined by statute.  Rubio-
Segura, 2012 WL 5381843, at *2 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (2012)).  
The appellant further argued that “because first-degree assault is equivalent to 
fifth-degree assault when death results from the assault, the criminal statutes 
governing second-degree unintentional felony murder based on first-degree 
assault and first-degree misdemeanor manslaughter based on fifth-degree assault 
have the same elements but different penalties.”  Id.  The appellant therefore 
contended that the statutes conflicted and the manslaughter statute, being the 
more specific of the two, should control.  Id.  The court of appeals declined to 
address the appellant’s argument because it was raised for the first time on appeal.  
Id. at *3. 
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3. Other Collateral Consequences for Defendants 
Finally, in addition to the collateral consequences that 
accompany a quick conviction for assault, an individual may suffer 
consequences from the court’s decision in Fleck without ever being 
charged or convicted.  Several federal and state statutes and 
regulations impose legal consequences on individuals based on the 
mere commission of a crime or an arrest.149  The most notable 
example is the Minnesota Department of Human Services (“DHS”) 
Background Studies Act (“BSA”).150  The BSA requires anyone age 
thirteen years or older who works with or for licensed DHS facilities 
to undergo a background check for suitability and security.151  
Examples of professionals who must undergo this background 
check include nurses, personal care attendants, social workers,152 
and surgical technicians.153  And if the individual seeks to provide 
DHS services from their household, all members of household 
must also undergo the background check.154  During the 
background check, “if the commissioner has reasonable cause to 
believe the information is pertinent to the disqualification of an 
individual,” the Commissioner may review “arrest and investigative 
information” from a variety of sources, including the Minnesota 
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, county attorneys, county 
sheriffs, local police, the courts, and the FBI.155  After reviewing this 
information, the DHS Commissioner must disqualify an individual 
if a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the individual has 
 
 149.  For example, nonimmigrant visitors and tourists who commit any felony 
must be automatically deported.  8 C.F.R. § 214.1(g) (2012).  And immigrants who 
are found to pose a danger to the community of the United States are ineligible 
for asylum.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).  In Minnesota, a person 
charged with a violent felony cannot be licensed as a school bus driver until that 
individual is found not guilty of the charge.  MINN. R. 7414.0400, subpt. 3 (2012). 
 150.  MINN. STAT. §§ 245C.01–.34. 
 151.  See id. § 245C.03. 
 152.  See Thompson v. Comm’r of Health, 778 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2010) (discussing a social worker who was disqualified from jobs that 
involved any contact with facilities licensed by DHS because he was charged with a 
drug offense, but the charges were dropped after he completed a diversion 
program). 
 153.  See Awes v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, No. A05-220, 2005 WL 3111848 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005) (reviewing denial of a request for reconsideration of a 
relator who had been employed at a hospital as a surgical technician for five years 
when his background check revealed a fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct 
charge in his juvenile record). 
 154.  § 245C.03, subdiv. 1(a)(2), (5). 
 155.  Id. § 245C.08, subdiv. 3.   
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committed certain enumerated crimes, regardless of whether the 
crime was a felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor.156  
Commission of an assault—regardless of whether an arrest or 
conviction followed—results in either a permanent or fifteen-year 
disqualification.157  Under Fleck, a person who has done a volitional 
act that resulted in bodily harm to another person has committed 
an assault of some degree and will be disqualified from providing 
services requiring licensing from the DHS. 
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
A. Adopt the Model Penal Code Mental States and Impose a Purpose, 
Knowledge, or Recklessness Requirement for Assault-Harm Crimes 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fleck decision illuminates a 
significant problem with the criminal code’s definitions of “mental 
state.”  Notwithstanding the legislature’s intent to depart from the 
common law general/specific intent dichotomy in drafting 
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 9,158 the definitions 
of mental states are imprecise enough that Minnesota courts still 
revert to the common law concepts in interpreting criminal 
statutes, such as the assault statute.159 
Reliance on the common law general/specific intent 
dichotomy is problematic for a few reasons.  First, these concepts 
have led to “confusion” and “consternation” among courts that 
have grappled with them,160 including the United States Supreme 
Court.161  In jurisdictions where this distinction persists, there is a 
 
 156.  Id. § 245C.14, subdiv. 1(a)(2). 
 157.  Id. §§ 245C.15, subdiv. 1(a) (imposing a permanent disqualification for 
first- and second-degree assault), 245C.15, subdiv. 2(a) (imposing a fifteen-year 
disqualification for assault in the third, fourth, or fifth degree). 
 158.  See State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72–73 (Minn. 1996), superseded by 
statute, MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 1(a) (1997). 
 159.  See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012); see also State v. 
Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn. 1998); Orsello, 554 N.W.2d at 72; State v. 
Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. 1981); State v. Cogger, 802 N.W.2d 407, 
409–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 160.  Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law 
and Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 356 (2001) (quoting 
People v. Colantuono, 865 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1994)). 
 161.  See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (splitting 5-4 on 
question of whether federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1994), 
required general or specific intent). 
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lack of consistency across appellate decisions.162  Indeed, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has been criticized for its inconsistent 
application of the concepts of specific and general intent.163 
Second, the common law general/specific intent dichotomy 
provides ample room for judicial interpretation.164  Where there is 
opportunity for interpretation about the mental state required for 
a crime, courts may simply apply their own policy ideas in assigning 
a particular mens rea requirement.165  Some courts explicitly 
recognize that policy implications should be considered.166  Other 
courts do not acknowledge the policy considerations underlying 
their decisions and instead purport to rely on purely legal 
analyses.167  The danger with such practices, however, is that courts 
are crossing over into the exclusive legislative function of defining 
 
 162.  See generally Batey, supra note 160, at 367–99. 
 163.  See MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 39, § 44.3 n.6 (observing that “[t]here 
is a lack of consistency” in Minnesota Supreme Court opinions addressing general 
and specific intent and that opinions “on occasion fail to cite important 
authorities and principles”). 
 164.  Miguel Angel Mendez, A Sisyphean Task: The Common Law Approach to 
Mens Rea, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 422–23 (1995). 
 165.  Batey, supra note 160, at 344. 
 166.  See People v. Colantuono, 865 P.2d 704, 708 (Cal. 1994) (citing People v. 
Hood, 462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1969)) (noting that when “a conventional specific 
intent-general intent inquiry” failed to directly resolve question of whether 
intoxication defense applied to assault, the court resorted to policy considerations, 
which favored a finding of general intent, precluding intoxication defense). 
 167.  Despite the strong brief submitted by the amici organizations advocating 
on behalf of domestic abuse victims, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fleck decision 
does not mention any policy considerations in concluding that assault is a general-
intent crime to which the intoxication defense does not apply.  This absence is 
unsurprising given the court’s recent declarations that it is reluctant to invade the 
policy-making function of the other branches of government.  See, e.g., In re 
Welfare of M.L.M., 813 N.W.2d 26, 35 (Minn. 2012) (“These statutes express the 
public policy judgments of the Legislature.  It is not our role to second-guess these 
policy judgments.”); State v. Randolph, 800 N.W.2d 150, 164–65 (Minn. 2011) 
(Stras, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In my view, we create too 
much uncertainty for litigants when we ignore the clear direction provided by our 
rules of procedure in pursuit of the policy or spirit of a rule.”); Laase v. 2007 
Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 440 (Minn. 2009) (“[I]t is the role of the 
legislature, not the courts, to rewrite the statute . . . .  The public policy arguments 
therefore should be advanced to the legislature, the body that crafted the 
language that compels the result here.”); Morris v. State, 765 N.W.2d 78, 85 
(Minn. 2009) (“The development of a state policy on how the right to 
misdemeanor appellate counsel in the postconviction setting is vindicated involves 
public policy and funding issues that, in the first instance, are better left to the 
legislature.”).  But see Batey, supra note 160, at 344–61 (identifying cases where 
courts’ policy judgments appeared to underlie determinations of whether 
particular offenses required specific or general intent). 
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crimes.168 
Given these concerns, it would be appropriate for the 
Minnesota legislature to devise a statutory solution rather than 
relying on our state appellate courts to continue wrestling with the 
existing statutes, which are often interpreted by reference to the 
common law.  First and foremost, the legislature should revise 
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 9, to modify the 
definitions of mental states and impose a mens rea requirement for 
each element of an offense.169  Then, the legislature should take an 
offense-by-offense approach to clarifying the mental state required 
for specific crimes, including assault. 
The drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC), which originally 
inspired Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 9,170 
specifically rejected the general/specific intent dichotomy.171  The 
MPC sets forth four distinct mental states: purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, and negligence.172  In turn, most offenses included in 
 
 168.  “[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal 
punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, 
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”  United States v. Bass, 
404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). 
 169.  For a comprehensive discussion of adopting MPC mental states, see Ted 
Sampsell-Jones, Mens Rea in Minnesota and the Model Penal Code, 39 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1457 (2013). 
 170.  State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Minn. 1996), superseded by statute, 
MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 1(a) (1997). 
 171.  See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2), 2.04(1)(a) (Official Draft & Revised 
Comments 1985). 
 172.  The four mental states provided by the Model Penal Code are the 
following: 
(a) Purposely. 
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense 
when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result 
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature 
or to cause such a result; and 
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware 
of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that 
they exist. 
(b) Knowingly. 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense 
when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant 
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that 
such circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it 
is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. 
(c) Recklessly. 
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the MPC denote the mental state required.173  Assault, under the 
MPC, is defined as the following: 
(1) Simple Assault.  A person is guilty of assault if he: 
(a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or 
recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or 
(b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a 
deadly weapon; or 
(c) attempts by physical menace to put another in 
fear of imminent serious bodily injury. 
Simple assault is a misdemeanor unless committed in 
a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in 
which case it is a petty misdemeanor. 
(2) Aggravated Assault.  A person is guilty of aggravated 
assault if he: 
(a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, 
or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or 
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life; or 
(b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly 
causes bodily injury to another with a deadly 
weapon.174 
The foregoing definitions of assault have been adopted in 
many jurisdictions.175  When read in conjunction with the MPC 
 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense 
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose 
of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard 
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding 
person would observe in the actor’s situation. 
(d) Negligently. 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense 
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be 
of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, 
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard 
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. 
Id. § 2.02(2). 
 173.  Id. explanatory note.  For those offenses that do not contain an explicit 
mens rea requirement, the MPC instructs how to read such a requirement into an 
offense.  See id. §§ 2.02(1), (3), (4), (9). 
 174.  Id. § 211.1. 
 175.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-22 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess. 
and 1st Spec. Sess.); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.230 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d 
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definitions of the culpable mental states, the MPC’s articulation of 
assault leaves little to no room for judicial interpretation or 
arbitrary enforcement.  And by requiring more than a general 
intent—purpose, knowledge,176 or recklessness—the MPC 
definition of assault resolves the chief problem created by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fleck decision: the possibility that a 
volitional physical act, unaccompanied by intent to inflict harm, 
will create criminal liability.  It also resolves another problem 
created by Fleck—the fact that Minnesota’s existing assault statute 
sets forth one offense that contains two different intent 
requirements. 
If, in the legislature’s judgment, public policy supports making 
the defense of voluntary intoxication unavailable to individuals 
charged with assault, the MPC offers another appropriate solution.  
Under the MPC, voluntary intoxication, or “self-induced 
intoxication,” is not a defense to offenses that contain the element 
of recklessness.177  In the case of assault, as defined by the MPC, 
 
Reg. Sess. and 3rd Spec. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1203 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-204 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 2d Reg. Sess. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 611 (West, Westlaw through 78 Laws 2012, chs. 204–409); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-
712 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.030 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess. and 2012 1st Extraordinary Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207 (West, Westlaw through 2012 legislation); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-3-7 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.070 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-201 (West, Westlaw 
through 2011 legislation); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-310(1)(a) (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:1 (West, Westlaw through 
ch. 1, 2013 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.13(a), (b) (West, Westlaw 
through 2011 legislation); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.160 (West, Westlaw through 
2012 Reg. Sess.); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2701(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 
 176.  Case law exists that equates general intent and the MPC’s knowledge 
requirement, but as LaFave explains in his definitive criminal law treatise, the 
MPC mental states require knowledge of the attendant circumstances and not just 
the absence of accidental conduct.  See LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 5.2(b). 
 177.  The Model Penal Code sets forth the following intoxication defense: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section, intoxication of 
the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense. 
(2) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, 
due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would 
have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial. 
(3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the 
meaning of Section 4.01. 
(4) Intoxication that (a) is not self-induced or (b) is pathological is an 
affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time 
of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its 
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therefore, a defendant charged with assault cannot rely on 
voluntary intoxication to avoid liability. 
B. Encourage the Minnesota Legislature to Amend the Assault       
Statutes to More Clearly Define the Prohibited Conduct and          
Mens Rea Requirements 
If the legislature is unwilling to more explicitly adopt the 
mental states outlined in the MPC, the next best solution is for the 
legislature to amend the definition of assault within the existing 
framework.  As previously discussed in Part IV, the two key 
problems created in Fleck are the lack of clarity about the conduct 
prohibited by the assault-harm statutes and the absence of any 
mens rea requirement.  The simplest way to address both issues is 
to overrule the court’s decision in Fleck and explicitly make assault-
harm a specific-intent crime.178  Requiring the defendant to have 
acted with the intent to inflict harm clarifies the prohibited 
conduct (any act performed with the intent to inflict harm) and 
guarantees that the defendant knew the facts that made his 
conduct illegal (he performed the act with the intent to inflict 
harm).  When enacting this change, the legislature should use the 
phrase “with intent to” to clearly signal its intent to make assault-
harm a specific-intent crime.179  And, as previously mentioned, to 
 
criminality [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law. 
(5) Definitions. In this Section unless a different meaning plainly is 
required: 
(a) “intoxication” means a disturbance of mental or physical 
capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the 
body; 
(b) “self-induced intoxication” means intoxication caused by 
substances that the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the 
tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, 
unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such 
circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime; 
(c) “pathological intoxication” means intoxication grossly excessive 
in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor 
does not know he is susceptible. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985). 
 178.  Other states have concluded that assault is a specific-intent crime.  See, 
e.g., State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 264–65 (Iowa 2010) (holding that assault is 
a specific-intent crime despite the Iowa legislature’s attempt to make it a general-
intent crime by introducing the assault statute with the phrase “[a]n assault as 
defined in this section is a general intent crime.”). 
 179.  See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (“If the Legislature 
intended to require an additional, special mental element, it could have defined 
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prevent the public policy concerns that the amici in Fleck warned 
of, the legislature could simultaneously amend the voluntary 
intoxication statute to either limit or prohibit use of the defense in 
some (e.g., domestic assault) or all cases of assault.180 
If the legislature is unwilling to overrule the court’s decision in 
Fleck and definitively state that assault-harm is a specific-intent 
crime, then either the legislature or the courts should clarify the 
behavior prohibited under the assault statutes to give fair notice to 
citizens.  The courts and legislature should look to other states’ 
assault statutes for language that provides a greater description 
than “a physical act.”  For example, Utah defines an assault as an 
act “committed with unlawful force or violence,”181 and aggravated 
assault requires an act that uses “other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury.”182  Other states require 
contact that a reasonable person would regard as “extremely 
offensive or provocative.”183  And the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
has held that specific intent to injure is not necessary to constitute 
an assault if the defendant’s conduct “exposes another to personal 
injury, and does in fact cause such injury.”184  All of these 
definitions more clearly state the types of physical acts that could 
constitute an assault and thereby put citizens on explicit notice as 
to what conduct is prohibited. 
C. Recognize Assault and Battery as Two Distinct Crimes 
A third, less desirable option is to recognize assault and battery 
as two distinct crimes.  Historically, assault and battery were 
different crimes.  At common law, a battery, but not an assault, 
 
assault-harm as ‘an act done with the intent to cause bodily harm to another.’”). 
 180.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.051 (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Reg. 
Sess.) (abolishing the voluntary intoxication defense); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2901.21(C) (Westlaw) (abolishing the voluntary intoxication defense); Montana v. 
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (holding, in a plurality decision, that a defendant 
does not possess a constitutional right to present evidence of voluntary 
intoxication as a defense). 
 181.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 4th 
Special Sess.). 
 182.  Id. § 76-5-103(1)(b). 
 183.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. 
Sess.); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2011 
Reg. Sess. and 1st Called Sess. of 82d Legislature) (defining assault as intentionally 
or knowingly causing physical contact that the person causing the contact knows 
or should know that the other will regard “as offensive or provocative”). 
 184.  Saunders v. State, 345 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tenn. 1961) (citation omitted). 
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required physical contact in the form of an injury or offensive 
touching.  An assault, on the other hand, was defined as an 
attempted battery or an intentional frightening.185  Today, several 
jurisdictions continue to recognize assault and battery as distinct 
crimes,186 while Minnesota and other states have labeled conduct 
that was traditionally considered a battery as the crime of assault.187 
Minnesota’s definition of “assault” criminalizes three acts in a 
single sentence: (1) assault-fear,188 (2) assault-harm, and (3) 
attempted assault-harm.189  At present, assault-fear and attempted 
assault-harm require specific intent, while assault-harm requires 
general intent.190  To clean up the statute and establish continuity 
throughout the assault statute, the legislature could re-define 
assault-harm as battery.  An “assault” would then be defined 
according to common law—as either an intentional frightening or 
an attempted battery.  Although this change would not remedy the 
mental state problems the court introduced in Fleck, it would at 
least guarantee that assault—now confined to assault-fear and 
attempted assault-harm—is always a specific-intent crime.  
Additionally, because a common law battery requires “an offensive 
 
 185.  2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 16.1(a) (2d ed. 2003). 
 186.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 240, 242 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 784.011(1), .03 (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Reg. 
Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-20(a), 16-5-23(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-901, -903 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. 
Sess.); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-1, 5/12-3 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 97-
1144 of 2012 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5412(a), 21-5413(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.471(1)(a), 
.481(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3-1, 30-
3-4 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 641, 642 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-2-9(b), (c) 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 1st Extraordinary Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-
501(a), (b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Budget Sess.). 
 187.  See LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 16.3. 
 188.  MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 10(1) (2012) (“‘Assault’ is . . . an act done 
with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death . . . .”). 
 189.  Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 10(2) (“‘Assault’ is . . . the intentional infliction of or 
attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.”). 
 190.  The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to address whether an attempt 
to inflict bodily harm is a specific-intent crime.  State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 312 
n.5 (Minn. 2012).  But it is axiomatic that attempt crimes require the specific 
intent to commit the underlying offense.  See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 41 
(“[C]riminal attempts require proof of an intent to bring about the consequences 
set forth in the crime attempted, and this is so even though no such intent is 
required for the completed crime”). 
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touching,” lawful and benign contact between the alleged offender 
and victim could not form the basis of a criminal prosecution.191 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Fleck 
highlighted problems within the Minnesota Criminal Code 
regarding mental state requirements.  In holding that assault-harm 
under Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 10, 
constitutes a general-intent crime, the court in effect imposed strict 
liability for the commission of any volitional physical act that results 
in bodily harm to another person.  Not only does the court’s 
decision conflict with firmly embedded principles of criminal 
jurisprudence, it also has the potential to impact several areas of 
criminal, civil, and administrative law.  To resolve the issues created 
in Fleck, the Minnesota legislature should fully adopt the mental 
states articulated in the Model Penal Code and integrate those 




 191.  See LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 16.2(a) (stating that most states’ statutes 
include a requirement that “the contact be ‘offensive,’ ‘insulting or provoking,’ or 
done ‘in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.’”). 
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